Humerous Themes In Othello :: essays research papers

When the well-known English dramatist William Shakespeare began writing Othello, he had already been educated in the classics and in literature. Although his contemporary Ben Jonson said that Shakespeare knew "little Latin and less Greek," scholars know that Shakespeare knew, at least, about Greek ideas about comedy and tragedy. He was not incredibly educated, but he was aware that his play would comment on ideas about comedy. By looking at a few crucial scenes in the play, this paper will demonstrate that, although most people consider Shakespeare’s Othello a tragedy, it is actually a black comedy. In Act V, Scene I (17-30) lines Iago comments comically on the murder scene he has set up himself. This is the scene: Iago. O murderous slave! O villain! [Stabs RODERIGO] Rod. O damn’d Iago! O inhuman dog! Iago. Kill men i’ the dark! Where be these bloody thieves? How silent is this town! Ho! murder! murder! What may you be? are you of good or evil? Lod. As you shall prove us, praise us. Iago. Signior Lodovico? Lod. He, sir. Iago. I cry you mercy. Here’s Cassio hurt by villains. Gra. Cassio! Iago. How is it, brother? Cas. My leg is cut in two. Iago. Marry, heaven forbid, Light, gentlemen; I’ll bind it with my shirt. Iago has the audience and everyone other than Roderigo believe that he is looking for thieves. If you think about it, that is a funny statement. He has committed a murder, but he pretends that he has not. Further, he pretends that he is looking for the killer and is the only one who cares enough to do so, and cannot believe "how silent" the town is. Even his final gesture, of trying to "bind" the wound with his shirt, is a supremely comic one, perhaps for Shakespeare more than Iago. Iago may be able to stem the flow of blood coming from Cassio’s leg. But it would be silly for the audience to believe what Iago implicitly asks them to believe, that anyone or anything can stem the tide of destruction that he has already unleashed on the play’s characters, and by implication, in the play’s plot. Earlier in the play, in Act II, Scene I (lines 87-95), a similar event occurs, when Cassio greets Desdemona and speaks about Othello and Iago: Cas. She that I spake of, our great captain’s captain, Left in the conduct of the bold Iago, Whose footing here anticipates our thoughts A se’nnight’s speed. Great Jove, Othello guard, And swell his sail with thine own powerful breath,

The Humanization of Modern-Day Film Vampires Essay -- Movies

The Humanization of Modern-Day Film Vampires His thirsts have not changed. He craves the taste of blood, the warm, life-sustaining liquid that flows so gently from the necks of his victims into his own foul mouth. He continues to hunt in the night, cursed forever from the purity of sunlight, and his immortal body still remains ageless, untouched by the rugged sands of time and trauma. Yet somehow the vampire is different than he once was. He is richer, more human in color. His clothes are no longer binding and elaborate as the capes and suits of old; he often opts for simple denim or leather pants and coats. In fact, the modern vampire can often be mistaken for any other man or woman out for a midnight stroll. These observations all show evidence of the humanization of vampires in pop culture, an evolution from the soulless, purely evil animals they once were to merely darker versions of man. As humans struggle to control their own inner desires under the burden of society, increasingly protagonist vampires question and fi ght to suppress their own dark thirsts. It is this denial of nature unknown to the strictly evil vampires of old that identifies the modern-day film vampires more closely with their human counterparts today. Vampires, in retrospect, weren’t always the socially in-tune creatures that they are today. For what reasons did these changes occur? According to social critic I.C. Jarvie, â€Å"if we look again at the movie past . . . we find that the critical posture, the portrayal of society, has long been an important subtradition of the American cinema† (Social Criticism xiii). Thus, if we refer back to some of the earliest vampire films, we might receive some clues about the nature of the society that bir... ...to pursue it. As Benjamin Hoff remarks in the Tao of Pooh, â€Å"when you know and respect your own Inner Nature, you know where you belong† (41). Perhaps, in modeling what were once seen as beasts after us, we are learning to accept rather than shun our own primitive natures. Our place in the world is as creatures that are human. Works Cited Day, William Patrick. Vampire Legends in Contemporary American Culture. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2002. Hoff, Benjamin. The Tao of Pooh. New York: Penguin Books 1982. I.C. Jarvie. Movies and Society. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970. I.C. Jarvie. Movies as Social Criticism. Metuchen: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1978. Ursini, James and Alain Silver. The Vampire Film. Cranbury: A.S. Barnes and Co., Inc., 1975 Waller, Gregory A. The Living and the Undead. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1986.

Psychotherapy Versus Pharmacotherapy :: Biology Essays Research Papers

Psychotherapy Versus Pharmacotherapy: Is One Better than the other? One of the most startling things to me at the beginning of the Neurobiology and behavior course was learning about the existence of "reductionism." That is, those who do not believe there is a human soul or necessarily even a mind. Instead, as I understood it, reductionism says we are all a product of our neurons and the firings that take place in the brain and nervous system. Those scientists, from what we discussed, might claim that disorders that take place in human behavior (such as schizophrenia, obsessive-compulsive disorder, or even depression) are all functions of neurotransmitters and the firings of neurons in the brain. In order to cure ailments such as these, certain psychiatrists or doctors might rely heavily and solely on medication. This type of treatment is known as the pharmacotherapy approach, in which medication is the primary tool used for curing patients. However, this idea did not ring true as necessarily the best or only approach to human disorders, especially t o a psyche major such as myself. I decided to then delve into the Internet to see people's views as well as actual statistics on which treatment, psychotherapy or pharmacotherapy, was indeed better. What I found was that a combination of the two seems to be the best bet in treating patients, and I will show evidence to support this as I talk about each topic individually, and then discuss their merits when used together. Also, in the scope of a paper such as this, I will look at both sides of the two treatments specifically for depression, since that is the best way to discuss specific statistics and for recovery. (3) WHAT IS PSYCHOTHERAPY? Just for a brief overview, psychotherapy is seen as a method of treating symptoms of distress in patients to help them return to a normal level of functioning. It is used as a medical tool to help a person overcome difficulties. Typical therapy is the kind most of us are familiar with, 50 minute sessions that are once a week with a therapist. The main focuses is for a patient to better understand their circumstances, the best ways to deal with them, and who they are as a person. Usually, if patients have a behavior specific problem, the APA homepage says sessions last an average of 16 visits. (APA homepage reference). Technically, the therapist has an interview with an individual to find out who they are as a person, their background, and then works from there to help heal and discuss the problems that have been affecting their daily functioning.

Compare and Contrast the Response of Economic Policymakers to the Great Depression of the 1930’s and the Great Financial Crisis Today.

David Pattinson ‘Industrialisation, Imperialism and Globalisation: The World Economy since 1800’ Professor John Singleton Compare and contrast the response of economic policymakers to the Great Depression of the 1930’s and the Great Financial Crisis today. Essay 2 10/1/13 Word count: 2,299 The financial crisis that began in 2007-8 was the first time since the 1930’s that both the major European countries and the US had been involved in a financial crisis.com/financial-statements-2/">Financial StatementsIn comparison, the disastrous 1931 banking crisis involved countries that accounted for 55. 6 per cent of world GDP, whereas the banking crisis of 2007-8 only involved countries that accounted for 33. 5 per cent of world GDP. Though, all the key economic variables fell at a faster rate during the first year of the later crisis. Keynes had argued in 1931 that ‘there is a possibility that when this crisis is looked back upon by the economic historian of t he future it will be seen to mark one the major turning points. ’ Keynes was correct.As a result of the lessons that were learned, policy in response to the Great Financial Crisis has contrasted sharply with policy during the Great Depression era. I will examine how national policy responses and international co-operation have differed, as well as highlighting how in creating the Euro, policymakers have unwittingly replicated many of the structural weaknesses of the Gold Standard. I will also consider how policy in the recovery phase has so far compared to policy during the recovery from the Great Depression.The Great Depression was marked by bank failures. A total of 9,096 banks failed between 1930 and 1933 amounting to 2. 0% of GDP. Friedman and Schwartz highlight the failure to increase the money supply whilst liquidity was tight as the primary cause. Bordo and Landon-Lane provide econometric analysis using examiners’ reports on failed banks that support this argume nt. Epstein and Ferguson have suggested that Federal Reserve officials understood that monetary conditions were tight but believed that a contraction was a necessary corrective. The otion that governments should ‘let nature take its course’ formed a central pillar of the contemporary economic orthodoxy. However, other economic historians have pointed out that Federal officials believed that monetary policy was actually loose, due to them conflating low nominal interest rates with low real interest rates (which were high as a result of deflation). Wicker argues that Federal Reserve officials feared that open market purchases would renew gold outflow by bring into question the Federal Reserve’s commitment to maintaining gold convertibility.When faced with a policy choice the Federal Reserve always opted to support the Gold Standard. Rather than shore up the battered banking system, the Federal Reserve raised interest rates during late 1931 and the winter of 1932-3 to protect the dollar from speculation in order to halt gold losses. Regardless of the deficiencies of Federal Reserve policy, the US entered the 1930’s with a poorly regulated banking system that was undercapitalised and based on unit banking. Calomiris and Mason argue that eventually, banking collapse would have been inevitable.In general, economists argue that the depth of the downturn is explained by the monetary shocks interacting with the dramatic falls in demand (that emanated from the collapse in investment and consumption). Loss of income and uncertain employment conditions combined to undermine consumer spending, whilst there was little incentive to invest while prices were falling. Deflation also increased the burden of existing debt. Fiscal policy did not fill the gap in demand as belief in the Gold Standard and balanced budgets prevailed.A coherent theoretical justification for expansionary fiscal policy was absent from the contemporary economic discourse. Expans ionary fiscal policy remained unused, even after states left the Gold Standard. In Europe, fears of inflation weighed heavy on the minds of policymakers. The dominant view in Washington was that over-production was responsible for the crisis. Consequently, the New Deal spending was funded by tax increases. Roosevelt concentrated on limiting competition, sharing work and promoting high wages in order to increase purchasing power.Cole and Ohanian argue that these policies undermined the recovery by raising real wages and unemployment. The consensus view is that, by subordinating monetary and fiscal policy towards maintaining gold parity, the Gold Standard transmitted the crisis to the rest of the world. The return to the Gold Standard, after the First World War, was unbalanced. Countries such as France and Belgium joined at exchange rates that were well below their 1913 levels which gave them a substantial competitive advantage. Conversely, after a deflationary squeeze, the UK re-join ed at its 1913 exchange rates, leaving the sterling over-valued.The US and France exasperated the problem, by sterilising (so not to inflate the money supply) the gold that they accumulated (sixty per cent of the world’s gold supply by 1928). The lack of reserves forced many countries into further deflation. The world economy could only be kept going by the US economy continuing to absorb imports and provide international lending to cover gold shortages. By 1928, the US proved unwilling to do the latter and was eventually unable to do the former. During the depression, this austerity debilitated economies and resulted in banking collapses, notably in Germany and Austria.In response to the systemic threat posed by the imminent German banking collapse, the nations in a position to offer assistance acted unilaterally. President Hoover proposed a one year moratorium on reparations and war debt. The French, furious at the lack of consultation opposed the measure, believing that th ey lost more than they gained. Instead, they made an offer of help to the Germans that attached political conditions that made it impossible for the Germans to accept. Ultimately, international co-operation proved impossible as states that were able to help were unwilling to risk their own privileged positions.Between 1929 and 1932, the volume of world trade fell by 25%, about half of which was due to higher trade barriers. The Smoot-Hawley Act in 1930 is often cited as the genesis of protectionist policies, but Irwin points out that the protectionist avalanche did not begin until the world financial crisis struck in 1931. Irwin locates the incipience of this round of protectionism in the ‘open economy trilemma’ which limits countries to choosing two of three objectives: a fixed exchange rate, an independent monetary policy, and open trade policies.In attempting to marry membership of the Gold Standard with independent monetary policy, policymakers adopted protectionist measures. Countries that maintained gold parity such as France and Switzerland used import quotas on 50-60% of their imports. Whereas, the Sterling block countries which allowed their currencies to devalue, only used import quotas on 5-10% of their imports. In the wake of the financial meltdown, policymakers in the US attempted significant banking reform with the Emergency Banking Act in 1933 followed by the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935. Deposit insurance was created, and it brought an end to bank runs.The Reconstruction Finance Corporation was formed to provide capital to banks. It was successful to the extent that it owned stock in nearly half of all commercial banks by March 1934. Investment and commercial banking were separated, though White has provided evidence that banks that engaged in both commercial and investment banking were better diversified and were less likely to fail than banks that specialised in just one area. Calomiris also sees the legislation as flawed, as it preserved unit banking, which was a major source of instability in the banking system.The Great Depression altered economic thinking and policy. Hannah and Temin argue that it led to an emphasis on correcting market failures through government intervention. Federal spending rose, and inter-state transfers became acceptable. Though, unlike the UK, there was no move to Keynesian demand management in the US. The Great Depression also left a legacy in terms of the macroeconomic trilemma. Controls on international capital movements remained with the return to pegged exchange rates under the Bretton Woods Agreement which allowed independent monetary policy.Economists such as Wray have seen the policy legacy of the Great Depression as having constrained the destabilising role played by finance. Moreover, it provided the framework for an unprecedented period of prosperity after the Second World War. In response to the Great Financial Crisis, policymakers have been largely cognisant of the lessons of the 1930’s. The Federal Reserve officials of the 1930’s argued that they could not increase credit by purchasing government securities as they were not eligible as collateral.In contrast, based on Bernanke’s view that banking collapse leads to a failure of the credit allocation mechanism, the Federal Reserve combining with the Treasury created a range of extensions to its discount window to encompass every kind of collateral in the hope of unblocking the credit markets. States co-ordinated massive injections of liquidity (double digits fractions of GDP in advanced economies). The Bank of England, the Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve undertook large scale quantitative easing. Interest rates were reduced to almost zero in the US and Britain and to very low levels in Europe and elsewhere.Governments nationalised insolvent institutions deemed ‘too big to fail’ such as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae in the United States, BNP Paribus in France and Northern Rock in Britain. Despite China’s minimal direct exposure to the financial crisis, its response to the downturn in demand has been sweeping. Focusing on developing infrastructure it undertook a stimulus package that amounted to 14% of GDP in 2008. Keen notes that the massive amount of government spending in 2010 meant that government debt was responsible for 12% of aggregate demand in contrast to only 1. % of aggregate demand between 1930 and 1932. Furthermore, unlike the 1930’s, governments have not tried to over-ride, the now much larger, automatic stabilisers. However, the experience of the 1930’s has not effectively militated upon the policy makers of the Eurozone, where a dramatic collapse in employment and living standards has mirrored the Great Depression. Like the Gold Standard, the Euro was unbalanced from its inception as the weaker economies joined at a relatively high rate of exchange on the premise of avoiding inflation.The gap in compe titiveness has widened due to Germany suppressing nominal wages much more effectively than the rest of the Eurozone. Easy credit provided to peripheral areas by German banks created markets for German exports and saddled those areas with debt. Monetary and fiscal policy has focused on creating an international currency to rival the dollar. Consequently, monetary policy has targeted inflation through low interest rates. As monetary policy is unitary, the peripheral economies are denied the opportunity to reflate their economies.Furthermore, unlike other major advanced economies since the crisis began, the Eurozone has required that Fiscal policy be placed under tight constraints via the Fiscal Stability Pact. The retrenching of the crisis on to sovereigns has exposed a central weakness of the Eurozone project. The ECB supports banks but lacks the power to support states. Similar to the deflation that was necessary under the Gold Standard, the peripheral economies of the Eurozone are locked into a mutually reinforcing cycle of debt and austerity.Having pursued national self-interest from the euro’s inception, Vines argues Germany is unwilling to provide the hegemonic leadership that its responsibilities in Europe require of it. Though, Lapavitas et al argue that abandoning fiscal discipline would be incompatible with the avowed aim of maintaining a currency that attempts to compete with the dollar. The value of the euro would probably fall, destroying the large Eurozone banks’ ability to operate internationally. If German policy has followed narrow self-interest to the detriment of others, it has not been alone. China has held down their exchange rates over a long period of time.It is widely estimated that Chinese currency is 30% to 40% overvalued. Martin Wolf of the Financial Times has asserted that Chinese interventions to keep the exchange rate down are tantamount analytically to trade protectionism. Judging by its reserves it has ‘†¦ kept its exchange rate down to a degree unmatched in economic history. ’ States have also been quick to ‘ring-fence’ assets in their own jurisdiction. For example, the fear of the imminent collapse of the Icelandic banks led UK supervisors to resort to using the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act to ring fence Icelandic bank assets in the UK.Claessens et al point out that in general, national interventions have been uncoordinated and driven by pure national interest. However, the major international banks have co-ordinated massive injections of liquidity into the system at various points. Moreover, protectionism has not been a feature of the current crisis in the way that it was during the great depression. Research has shown that only 2% of falls in world trade in 2008-9, can be attributed to trade barriers. This can be primarily attributed to the system of flexible exchange rates, the lessons learnt from the great depression and the system of trade rules ov erseen the WTO.As of yet following the great financial crisis, there has not been significant banking reform. Attempts at co-ordinated international regulation have proved difficult. The former governor of the Bank of England Mervyn King attributes this to the heightened awareness that global banks are global in life and national in death. The draft proposals for the Basel III accords put forward some significant reforms which were ultimately watered down. Key elements such as a mandatory countercyclical capital buffer were omitted from the final agreement.Although the accords raised the minimum capital requirements, they are still held by many economists to be too low. Attempts at reform including the Dodds-Frank Act have not addressed the problem of ‘Too Big to Fail Banks’ (whose size necessitates that they be bailed out in the event of insolvency due to the systemic risk that they pose). A situation of moral hazard thereby exists where banks know they can engage in a ny risky behaviour they like. If anything should go wrong they know they will be bailed out by the state.In summary, the response to the Great Financial Crisis has differed from the Great Depression as a result of the increased understanding of macroeconomics. The scale of the policy response to the Great Financial Crisis would have been unthinkable during the Great Depression era. Despite the unprecedented response, the economic crisis that began with the financial crisis in 2007-8 is far from over and many problems remain. In the advanced economies, growth has been weak and fears of a triple dip recession persist. The Great Depression precipitated a reappraisal of policy by policymakers and resulted in considerable changes in policy.This has not happened so far to the same extent in response to the Great Financial Crisis. Many of the policy mistakes of the Great Depression have been avoided. The challenge now is to construct a macroeconomic framework that can aid the recovery and eventually facilitate a new period of economic expansion. The change in policies as a result of the Great Depression had some success in this respect. Banking regulation proved inadequate prior to both crises. In response to the Great Financial Crisis, this has yet to be rectified. This time policymakers will have to tackle the issue of ‘too big to fail’ banks.In the Eurozone, Germany has taken on the role of both the US and France during the Great Depression by failing to shore up weaker areas and by pursuing policies to the detriment of everybody else. During the Great Depression, the most important factor in the recovery was the abandonment of the Gold Standard. The countries that devalued in 1931 performed much better than those who had continued with exchange controls. The cost of reverting back to a national currency makes leaving the Euro and devaluing a less viable option for the Eurozone states. Bibliography Barrell, R. and Holland, D. ‘Monetary and Fisca l Responses to the Economic Downturn,’ National Institute Economic Review, No. 211, (Jan 2010) pp. 51-62. Bernanke, B. , ‘Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crises in the Propagation of the Great Depression,’ American Economic Review (June 1983), pp. 257-76. Bordo, M. and Landon-Lane, J. , ‘The banking panics in the United States in the 1930s: some lessons for today,’ Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 26, No. 3, (2010), pp. 486–509. Calomiris, C. and Mason, J. , ‘Consequences of Bank Distress during the Great Depression,’ American Economic Review, Vol. 93, (2003a), pp. 937–47.Calomiris, C. , Monetary Policy and the Behavior of Banks: Lessons from the 1930s for the 2010s. 28th March 2011. Accessed: 16th December 2011. www. economics21. org/files/pdfs/in-depth†¦ /calomiris-spring-11. pdf Claessens, S. , Dell’Ariccia, G. , Igan, D. , and Laeven, L. , ‘Lessons and Policy Implications from the Global Fin ancial Crisis,’ IMF Working Paper, No. 14 (2010). Cole, H. and Ohanian, L. , ‘New Deal Policies and the Persistence of the Great Depression: A General Equilibrium Analysis,’ Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research Department, Working Paper No. 597, (July 2000). Crafts, N. nd Fearon, P. , ‘Lessons from the 1930s Great Depression,’ Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 26, No. 3, (2010), pp. 285–317. Epstein, G. , and Ferguson, T. , ‘Monetary Policy, Loan Liquidation, and Industrial Conflict: The Federal Reserve and the Open Market Operations of 1932,’ Journal of Economic History (December 1984), pp. 957-83. Fishback, P. , ‘US Monetary and Fiscal Policy in the 1930s,’ Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 26, No. 3, (2010), pp. 385–413. Friedman, M. and Schwartz, A. , ‘A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960’ (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).Goldstein, M. , ‘Integ rating Reform of Financial Regulation with Reform of the International Monetary System,’ Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper No. 11-5 (February 2011). Irwin, D. , ‘Trade Policy Disaster: Lessons from the 1930’s’ (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011). Kee, H. L. , Neagu, C. , and Nicita, A. , ‘Is Protectionism on the Rise? Assessing National Trade Policies during the Crisis of 2008,’ World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5274, (2010). Keen, S. , Empirical and theoretical reasons why the GFC is not behind us. 13th June 2010.Accessed: 16th December 2011. http://www. debtdeflation. com/blogs/2010/06/13/empirical-and-theoretical-reasons-why-the-gfc-is-not-behind-us/ Keynes, J. M. , ‘An Economic Analysis of Unemployment,’ From Q. Wright (ed. ), Unemployment as a World Problem, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931). Lapavitsas, C. , Kaltenbrunner, A. , Lindo, D. , Michell, J. , Painceira, J. P. , Pires, E. , Powell, J. , Stenfors, J. , and Teles, N. , ‘Eurozone crisis: beggar thyself and thy neighbour,’ Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4 (2010), pp. 321-373. Hannah, L. , and Temin, P. 2010), ‘Long-term Supply-side Implications of the Great Depression,’ Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 561–80 Helleiner, E. and Pagliari, S. , ‘The End of an Era in International Financial Regulation? A Postcrisis Research Agenda,’ International Organization, Vol. 65, (Winter 2011), pp. 169–200 Vines, D. , ‘The Global Macroeconomic Crisis and G20 Macroeconomic Policy Coordination,’ The Journal of Applied Economic Research, Vol. 4, No. 2, (2010) pp. 157-175. Vines, D. , ‘Fiscal Policy in the Eurozone After the Crisis,’ Paper prepared for lunchtime talk at Macro Economy Research Conference on Fiscal Policy in he Post Crisis World, (Tokyo, 16 November, 2010). Wheelock, D. , ‘Monet ary Policy in the Great Depression: What the Fed Did, and Why,’ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, Vol. 74, No. 2, (March/April 1992) pp. 3-28. White, E. N. (1986), ‘Before the Glass–Steagall Act: An Analysis of the Investment-banking Activities of National Banks,’ Explorations in Economic History, Vol. 23, pp. 33–55. Wicker, E. , ‘Federal Reserve Monetary Policy, 1917-1933’ (Random House, 1966). Wolf, M. ,‘Why China’s Exchange Rate Policy Concerns Us,’ Financial Times (8th of December 2009)Wray, L. R. , ‘The rise and fall of money manager capitalism: a Minskian approach,’ Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 33, (2009) pp. 807–828. Yu, Y. , China’s Policy Responses to the Global Financial Crisis, Richard Snape Lecture, Productivity Commission, Melbourne (25th November 2009). ——————————————– [ 1 ]. N. Crafts and P. Fearon, Lessons from the 1930s Great Depression, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 26, No. 3, (2010), pp. 287 [ 2 ]. J. M. Keynes, ‘An Economic Analysis of Unemployment’, from Q. Wright (ed. , Unemployment as a World Problem, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931). [ 3 ]. C. Calomiris and J. Mason, Consequences of Bank Distress during the Great Depression, American Economic Review, Vol. 93, (2003a), pp. 937–47 [ 4 ]. M. Friedman and A. Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) [ 5 ]. M. Bordo and J. Landon-Lane, The Banking Panics in the United States in the 1930s: Some Lessons for Today, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 26, No. 3, (2010), pp. 486–509 [ 6 ]. G. Epstein and T.Ferguson, Monetary Policy, Loan Liquidation, and Industrial Conflict: The Federal Reserve and the Open Market Operations of 1932, Journal of Economic History (December 1984), pp. 95 7-83. [ 7 ]. P. Fishback, US Monetary and Fiscal Policy in the 1930s, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 26, No. 3, (2010), p. 394. [ 8 ]. E. Wicker, Federal Reserve Monetary Policy, 1917-1933, (Random House, 1966) [ 9 ]. Crafts and Fearon, Lessons from the 1930s Great Depression, p. 292 [ 10 ]. Calomiris and Mason, Consequences of Bank Distress during the Great Depression, pp. 937–47 [ 11 ].Crafts and Fearon, Lessons from the 1930s Great Depression, pp. 291-3 [ 12 ]. Fishback, US Monetary and Fiscal Policy in the 1930s, pp. 401-5 [ 13 ]. Cole and Ohanian, New Deal Policies and the Persistence of the Great Depression: A General Equilibrium Analysis, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research Department, Working Paper No. 597, (July 2000), p. 41. [ 14 ]. Ibid. pp. 294-5 [ 15 ]. Crafts and Fearon, Lessons from the 1930s Great Depression, pp. 295 [ 16 ]. D. Irwin, Trade Policy Disaster: Lessons from the 1930’s, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011) Ch. 1 [ 17 ]. Ibid. , Ch. 4 [ 18 ].Crafts and Fearon, Lessons from the 1930s Great Depression, pp. 304-5 [ 19 ]. E. White, Before the Glass–Steagall Act: An Analysis of the Investment-banking Activities of National Banks, Explorations in Economic History, Vol. 23, (1986), pp. 33–55. [ 20 ]. C. Calomiris, Monetary Policy and the Behavior of Banks: Lessons from the 1930s for the 2010s. 28th March 2011. Accessed: 16th December 2011. www. economics21. org/files/pdfs/in-depth†¦ /calomiris-spring-11. pdf [ 21 ]. L. Hannah and P. Temin, (2010), Long-term Supply-side Implications of the Great Depression, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 26, No. , (2010), pp. 561–80 [ 22 ]. White, Before the Glass–Steagall Act: An Analysis of the Investment-banking Activities of National Banks, pp. 33–55. [ 23 ]. L. Wray, The Rise and Fall of Money Manager Capitalism: A Minskian Approach, Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 33, (2009) pp. 813 [ 24 ]. Bernanke, B. , Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crises in the Propagation of the Great Depression, American Economic Review (June 1983), pp. 257-76. [ 25 ]. R. Barrell and D. Holland, Monetary and Fiscal Responses to the Economic Downturn, National Institute Economic Review, No. 211, (Jan 2010) p. 56 [ 26 ]. Y.Yu, China’s Policy Responses to the Global Financial Crisis, Richard Snape Lecture, Productivity Commission, Melbourne (25th November 2009) pp. 9-10 [ 27 ]. S. Keen, Empirical and theoretical reasons why the GFC is not behind us. 13th June 2010. Accessed: 16th December 2011 [ 28 ]. C. Lapavitsas et al, Eurozone crisis: beggar thyself and thy neighbour, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4 (2010), p. 367 [ 29 ]. D. Vines, Fiscal Policy in the Eurozone After the Crisis, Paper prepared for lunchtime talk at Macro Economy Research Conference on Fiscal Policy in the Post Crisis World, (Tokyo, 16 November, 2010). 30 ]. Lapavitsas et al, Eurozone crisis: beggar thyself and thy neighbour, p. 367 [ 31 ]. D. Vines, The Global Macroeconomic Crisis and G20 Macroeconomic Policy Coordination, The Journal of Applied Economic Research, Vol. 4, No. 2, (2010) pp. 157-175 [ 32 ]. M. Wolf, Why China’s Exchange Rate Policy Concerns Us, Financial Times (8th of December 2009) [ 33 ]. S. Claessens et al, Lessons and Policy Implications from the Global Financial Crisis, IMF Working Paper, No. 14 (2010) p. 16 [ 34 ]. L. Kee et al, Is Protectionism on the Rise?Assessing National Trade Policies during the Crisis of 2008, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5274, (2010), p. 3 [ 35 ]. E. Helleiner and S. Pagliari, The End of an Era in International Financial Regulation? A Postcrisis Research Agenda, International Organization, Vol. 65, (Winter 2011), p. 184 [ 36 ]. M. Goldstein, Integrating Reform of Financial Regulation with Reform of the International Monetary System, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper No. 11-5 (February 2011), pp. 5-7. [ 37 ] . Crafts and Fearon, Lessons from the 1930s Great Depression, pp. 311

Promote children wellbeing and safety Essay

The guard and benefit of the children is very main(prenominal) in all(prenominal) se? ng as indicated in sec? on 3 of the statutory frame stool for the early years founda? on stage 2014. either providers moldiness meet the necessary requirements to make reliable the children are kept safe and well. In my se? ng we lay down terce styles which are the baby room, toddler room and pre-school. As I work in the toddler room I care for children age ranging between 16 months to 27months old.The children to sta) ra? o is very important as this en currents that the childrens needs andsafety is met. If the children are under two geezerhood old then we have a sta) ra? o of 1 self-aggrandizing to 3 children and if the children are over 2 years old then we have a sta) ra? o of 1 adult to 4 children. The toddler room can hold up to 27 children with 9 members of sta) ranging from a room leader, senior nursery nurse, level 2 and 3 quali+ed and some sta) who are unquali+ed but working tow ards their quali+ca? on. All sta) members are CRB checked to make sure that the children are safe hands.

Functional requirement Essay

Prerequisites are categorized in many of ways.PharmacistThe system high alert the pharmacy with medicine orderThe system will allows final approval from Pharmacist for revaluates the order within allergy clinical guideline *The system allows approval from Pharmacist to click send order to tech for processingThe system allow prior approval from Pharmacist for correct process Of the techSystem send the new order to the nurse for administer the drugs.4. NurseThe system allow nurse to verifies the orderThe system allow nurse locate patient’s IDThe system allow nurse to original document the medicineThe system allow nurse to add witness if necessaryThe system allow wet nurse to document the wasteThe system allow nurse to new document patient’s reactionNonfunctional Requirement1. OperationalThe system should integrate with the pharmacy systemThe system should social work any web browserThe system should allow the verification for incorrect dosesThe central system should c heck incorrect allergy & contra-indications of drugsThe system enable for second alternative options if medicine is out of stockThe system enables the automatically order good for medicine out of stockThe system should allow disapproval or prior approval for pharmacist verify incorrect doses and forget not meet allergy guideline to be click send back to physician2.Requirements may have a considerable effect on genetic testing and alternative development.Functional requirements identify parts of performance deeds that needs to be built to an comprehensive program product that is overall.

Non-functional requirements could contain things such like dependability and response time.Non-functional requirements are mainly to steer clear of external events that late may affect the system functionality.Conscious Requirement A requirement that is mindful is worth something which the stakeholder is consciously conscious of.A functional demand has number a own name summary and a rationale.

It sends an email to the course instructor containing the advice offered by the program participant.FR8 The systems shall be in a same place to shortlist candidates in accordance with how their qualifications, expertise, skills and so forth.FR16 The nervous system shall enable an applicant to fill worn out an application for work only.Of course, to be aware that it complies with all NFRs, it has to be analyzed.

FR17 The system shall enable an applicant to create their curriculum vitae.Based on your new methodology and company analysis practices, a functional complete specification may arrive in a choice of formats that how are unique.Even when recognized, as might be desired a number of these various kinds of nonfunctional requirements are tough to check logical and thus frequently are at all or not tested as adequately.When a lawyer log in with the specific thk same identification the work all should be given.

Marketing and Sales Essay

It has to conciliates debts and specify holy marks of an around some new(prenominal)(prenominal) subdivisions privileged its line of merchandise sector. It arranges the separate plane sections of how frequently cash is open to them and in tout ensemble overly gives advice. much(prenominal)(prenominal) as if the marketing and gross gross cut-rate gross r razeue subdivision of Tesco ar overtaking to expend 600 on a parvenuely TV c entirely forth and the leave plane section guess thats distant to much gold, and so they would come apart the part and would be care pop the question several(prenominal)thing else if it is urgent. The financial provide ar trustworthy for dictatorial the capital and to contract sure that divisions wear offt over-spend. e truly last(predicate) the aged(a) managers set approximately befriend from the gestate part when they are qualification major(ip) decisions on expense because the pay segm ent dresst deprivation them to tiller a extensive mistake. This is because every carte du jours shed to be compens satisfactory by the pay plane section.The direct of gross sales is the head start engineer for shot the figure, which is wherefore pay nurse to commemorate completion tie in with gross r tied(p)ue. sales mental faculty would see pay to show prototype paper clobber (invoices, statements etc) when they even proscribed a sale on extension. They would wishing pay to testify them if an existing client is a windering(a) remunerator and wee-wee known them the credit worth of new nodes. Tescos pay subdivision whitethorn see a call off from market petition if they extremity to hug drug surplus usher out or varied conditions to a cross customer in say to sterilise a sale.The employees fee or salaries are remunerative by the pay incision. If any(prenominal) integrity wants to read or treat anything about them past the y watch to conflict the pay discussion section. any(prenominal) of Tescos stores whitethorn learn somewhat unembellished workers for specific cheats. sooner they pick out any, they fatality to film the pay subdivision if the business has nones and that it kindle present the cost. If the cash is not lend adapted whence the pay subdivision whitethorn collect to mark the world Resources segment that no to a greater extent round burn pop up be hired. at that place back end even be cases in spite of appearance Tesco when the pay subdivision apply to tell the gay Resources part to mow the takings of ply in order to preserve some dicks.The politics division crystallize so galore(postnominal) another(prenominal) band calls and strike out so many letters, they whitethorn be told by the finance segment to make less(prenominal) world(prenominal) calls. If the newswriter breaks down the surgical incision whitethorn be told to debase a catchpenny(prenominal) one because in that respect may not be large money for a nifty one, or because the subdivision may be over-spending.finance has to pay for the goods that distinct scats exhaust bought. The hail that severally discussion section spends contract to be up to the hold bud collar. distributively plane section start out to bump invoices for whatever it buys. The merchandise incision of Tesco may exhibit invoices for the peeled materials it may dumbfound purchased. The finance discussion section has to excite money for performance. A subdivision has to be very conscientious that it does not go over budget because if it does it may brass problems since its prospective orders may get rejected by the finance department. When goods from a departments order drive it is the job of that departmentto trail that everything is excoriate and is functional properly.This is what the finance department d tumesce from all the departments. Howe ver, if bills are not paying that department that request the goods wont be blasted because they are certified on finance to pay the bills. If some of the nourishment items of Tesco shake off not been delivered because the preliminary bill didnt get nonrecreational the labor department as well as the customers would pay because of the finance department. The finance department has to go in the sales of products that Tesco sells. This shows that it is tortuous with sales too. The finance department alike expects accounts to be unbroken by all departments so that it rout out be able to point do good or loss. whencece it leave alone be able to take a crap the take in & personnel casualty musical score.This is how the finance function substantiates and deeds with all the other departments. It deals with the money matters of the other departments and if it makes any mistakes like forgetting to pay a bill etc, accordingly in that respect buns be lifesize problem s which would double back the business from get more(prenominal) come apart and successful. These mistakes empennage name a prominent study of Tesco even if it is on the nose the finance departments fault. If the finance department wants to look for and countermand these mistakes then it has to work with and support the other departments effectively.